Testing the role of comparative advantage and learning in wage and promotion dynamics by Hunnes, Arngrim
Discussion paper
SAM 23   2007
ISSN:  0804-6824
SEPTEMBER 2007
INSTITUTT  FOR  SAMFUNNSØKONOMI
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Testing the Role of Comparative 
Advantage and Learning in Wage 
and Promotion Dynamics
BY
ARNGRIM HUNNES
This series consists of papers with limited circulation, intended to stimulate discussion.
Testing the Role of Comparative Advantage and
Learning in Wage and Promotion Dynamics∗
Arngrim Hunnes†
July 31, 2007
Abstract
Can job assignment based on comparative advantage and learning about
workers’ ability explain wage and promotion dynamics within firms? In or-
der to answer this question the Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) model is es-
timated in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework using a
unique data set on white collar workers in Norway for the years 1987-1997.
The estimation is carried out on two different occupational groups: techni-
cal and administrative white collar workers. The selection of workers into
a given position within a firm hierarchy is based on comparative advantage.
Both measurable and unmeasurable skills are important. This holds in both
occupations studied. When it comes to firms’ learning about their workers
the results are not so clear. But overall the results on learning seem to have
stronger support than what previous studies have found. In general, there is
more evidence for learning about administrative white collar workers than
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1 Introduction
The literature on internal labor markets suggests that internal mobility of workers
is important. The theory assumes that workers are hired at lower levels in the
firm hierarchy (ports of entry) and promoted into higher positions. This internal
mobility is an important part of a firm’s personnel policy and serves two purposes.
The first is to make an efficient assignment of workers to jobs. The second is to
provide incentives. One way of creating incentives is to promote workers. Since
internal mobility has consequences for both the individual worker and the firm,
it is important to understand the underlying mechanisms. More specifically, the
question asked in this paper is: Can job assignment based on workers’ comparative
advantage and firms learning about workers’ ability explain wage and promotion
dynamics within firms?
This paper contributes to a very small empirical literature on wage and pro-
motion dynamics within firms using the Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) model
(GW99) as a theoretical framework. Methodologically, I follow Lluis (2005), but
extend on her paper along two dimensions. First, as pointed out by Osterman
(1982), firms may consist of “several often quite different internal labor markets.”
Therefore I analyze two large and important occupational groups separately; tech-
nical white collar workers and administrative white collar workers. Second, Lluis
(2005) has a relatively small survey from Germany, while I have a large administra-
tive data set. My data cover a population of white collar workers within firms and
changes in rank are reported by employers, not by the workers themselves. Also,
the institutional setting in Norway is more suitable for studying learning than in
Germany. Lluis speculates that her poor fit of the model with learning is due to the
apprenticeship system affecting her data.
My results suggest the following: Selection of workers into a given position
within a firm hierarchy is based on comparative advantage. Both measurable and
unmeasurable skills are important. This holds in both occupations studied. When it
comes to firms learning about their workers’ abilities the results are not so clear. In
general, there is more evidence for learning about administrative than for technical
white collar workers. Overall, and in contrast to what Lluis finds in the German
data, the results on learning seem to have support in the Norwegian data.
The paper unfolds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss relevant literature and
present an overview of GW99. Sections 4 and 5 present the data and some de-
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scriptive analysis. Section 6 describes the empirical setup along with a discussion
of several methodological challenges. Section 7 discuss the estimation results and
Section 8 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Background
Empirical findings by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a) (BGH) have inspired
much theoretical work including Gibbons and Waldman (1999b).1 Gibbons and
Waldman build an integrative model incorporating job assignment, on-the-job human-
capital acquisition, and learning.2 Comparative advantage implies that workers’
skills are rewarded differently at different hierarchical levels and workers are sorted
by their skills and abilities into a given position in the hierarchy.3 Firms learn about
the workers’ innate abilities over time. In the Gibbons and Waldman model there
is symmetric learning about workers’ abilities, implying that any new information
about the workers’ abilities is publicly known to all firms. The GW99 model ex-
plains five important findings in BGH. (1) real-wage decreases are not rare, but
demotions are. (2) Wage increases are serially correlated. (3) Promotions are as-
sociated with large wage increases. (4) Wage increases on promotion are small
relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder.
(5) Workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the
job ladder are promoted quickly to the next. Gibbons and Waldman derive their
model both without and with learning. In general, the learning case gives better
predictions. See Table 1.
Three previous papers use the GW99 model to study dynamics of wages and
careers within firms. They all differ in terms of methodology applied. Lima and
Pereira (2003) use Portuguese data for the years 1991–1995. The authors modify
the GW99 model somewhat to fit it into a fixed effect panel data estimation frame-
work. They assume full information about workers’ innate abilities at all times
and, as opposed to the comparative advantage hypothesis, that ability is rewarded
1Gibbons and Waldman (1999a) present a survey of careers within organizations. See also Gib-
bons (1998, 1997) and Baker, Jensen, andMurphy (1988). See Lazear and Rosen (1981) for a specific
theory of incentives and mobility; the tournament theory.
2In Gibbons andWaldman (2006) they enrich their 1999–model by including schooling and “task-
specific” human capital. The latter extension produces cohort effects.
3Formally, comparative advantage can be defined as follows (Sattinger, 1993). Define ai j as the
number of times that worker i can perform job j’s task per period. Worker 1 has a comparative
advantage at job 1 and worker 2 has a comparative advantage at job 2 if a11/a21 > a12/a22.
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the same at each hierarchical level. Given their simplifying assumptions they find
“a stronger employer learning and/or human capital accumulation effect at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy and a stronger job assignment effect at the top.”
Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw (2006) also use Portuguese data. The years
covered are 1991 to 2000. In contrast to the previous study they are more explicit in
testing the predictions of the GW99 model within a dynamic panel setting.4 Dias
da Silva and van der Klaauw find significant positive serial correlation in wage
increases and promotion rates, from which the authors conclude that employer
learning about the worker’s ability might be important. In their analysis they also
conclude that the Portuguese labor market is not competitive. After discussing
different definitions of promotion they “argue that employer–reported promotions
relate to a large extent to wage increases rather than changes in job tasks and com-
plexity.”5, 6
The third paper, which stands out from the other two with respect to methodol-
ogy, is Lluis (2005) using German survey data for the years 1985–1996. In contrast
to the two papers discussed above, she looks for whether one can find evidence of
comparative advantage and learning in her data, i.e. she investigates the underly-
ing theoretical building blocks in the GW99 model. The estimation is performed
within a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework. She finds that both
measured and unmeasured ability is important in the rank assignment, with un-
measured ability being most important at higher levels. However, it is hard to find
evidence of learning in her data set. She attributes this to the German apprentice-
ship systemwhere firms and workers have the opportunity to learn about the quality
of the match before workers finish formal education and start the job search. One
implication of this is reduced need for job mobility to learn about workers’ abil-
ities. This is supported by the low mobility figures she observes in the German
4See also Belzil and Bognanno (2005) for a similar (dynamic) approach but without the Gibbons-
Waldman model as the theoretical framework.
5Matthews (1986) writes: “[Promotion] is so familiar that it is easy to overlook just how com-
plicated it is. Typically is has all the following features. There is a system of ranks; responsibilities
go with rank; so does pay and usually pension, so that rank maximisation becomes the proxy for
income maximisation; promotion takes place only by one step at a time; there is property in rank, in
the sense that demotion occurs seldom or never, poor performance being penalised instead by lack of
future promotion or in extreme cases dismissal; there is retirement age, after which responsibilities
fall at a stroke from a lifetime high to zero.”
6Promotions can also be seen as pay for performance: “Promotions appear to be the most im-
portant form of pay for performance in most organizations, especially in hierarchical, white-collar
firms” (Gibbs, 1996).
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data.
The findings in the BGH study, the empirical foundation for GW99, were based
on evidence from one US firm only. However, labor market institutions differ
between countries. This makes it interesting to estimate the model on data for
different countries in order to facilitate comparative analysis, and assess whether
the model is as general as intended. In particular it is interesting to see whether
it is possible to find evidence of learning since Lluis did not find very compelling
evidence for this.
I use data of white collar workers in Norway for the years 1987–1997. The data
is collected by the main employers’ organization in Norway, and as such it differs
from the German data which is based on surveys among individuals. The data is
collected for wage negotiation purposes and is of high quality. One of its unique
features is that it contains information about the workers’ ranks. Another important
feature is that I have exact information on changes in the workers’ positions due
to detailed hierarchical codes recorded by the employers. In the German survey
data the workers themselves report changes in their positions. Given the sample
size, it is possible to estimate the model for two different occupations. The first is
technical white collar workers, 202,142 observations. The second is administrative
white collar workers, 227,077 observations. This makes it possible to compare two
different occupational groups and see whether the parameters of the model differ
between occupations. When estimating the GW99 model one needs a one period
lag in the no-learning case and a two period lag in the learning case. Lluis in her
paper maximizes the sample size depending on which version of the model she
estimates. Given my large sample, I can afford to keep the same sample size in
both the no-learning and learning case. In this way the results in the two model
versions are not affected by changes in the sample.
3 Gibbons and Waldman (1999): An Integrative Model
There are two versions of the model, one with full information and one with sym-
metric learning.
Full information In the model with full information, job assignment and human-
capital acquisition drive the dynamics in the model.
The economy consists of identical firms. There is free entry into production,
labor is the only input factor in production, and the firms and workers are risk-
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neutral and have a discount rate of zero. Worker i’s career lasts for T periods.
Let θi denote i’s innate ability, and assume that θi is common knowledge at the
beginning of the worker’s career. θi ∈ {θH ,θL} where H is high and L is low.
Worker i’s effective ability at time t (t = 1, . . . ,T ) is given by
ηit = θi f (xit) ( fx > 0 and fxx ≤ 0) (1)
where f (·) is some function of i’s labor-market experience xit prior to time t.
Firms have J hierarchical levels (jobs).7 Worker i produces
yi jt = d j+ c j(ηit + εi jt) (2)
if he is assigned to level j in period t. d j and c j are (technological) constants,
with 0 < dJ < dJ−1 < .. . < d1 and cJ > cJ−1 > .. . > c1 > 0, and εi jt is a noise
term/productivity shock with characteristics N(0,σ2).
Define η j as the solution to
d j+ c jη j = d j+1+ c j+1η j (3)
that is, η j is the level of effective ability that makes a worker equally productive at
level j as at level j+ 1. The worker is assigned to job j if ηit < η j. If ηit = η j,
then worker i is assigned to level j+1.
Since the production equation (2) is linear, the model is easy to depict graphi-
cally, see Figure 1 where J = 3.
An effective job assignment is along the bold line. If ηi jt < η1 a worker is
assigned to level 1, if η1 < ηi jt < η2 he is assigned to level 2, and if ηi jt > η2 he
is assigned to level 3. We note that as we move up in the hierarchy the worker’s
output is more sensitive to effective ability. The c j parameter is monotonically
increasing with the levels.8
7Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) use 3 hierarchical levels. Gibbons and Waldman (2006) use 2
since the model’s main conclusion is not sensitive to the number of levels.
8This is in line with e.g. Leonard (1990) who writes: “Position in the corporate hierarchy is
one of the strongest determinants of pay. In a number of economic models, this link is attributed
to the greater sensitivity of corporate success to the acts of higher-level executives than to those of
lower-level executives. Executives with a wider span of control are expected to have greater marginal
revenue products.”
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Figure 1: Worker assignment with J = 3. The effective job assignment is along
the bold line.
Because of competition among the firms wages w are equal to expected output
wi jt = Eyi jt = d j+ c jηi = d j+ c jθit f (xit). (4)
Note that since ηit increases monotonically with labor market experience de-
motions cannot occur.
Symmetric learning In this version of the model, firms are uncertain about the
worker’s innate ability θi. Let p0 be the firm’s initial belief that a worker’s innate
ability is θH at the beginning of the worker’s career and (1− p0) that the worker’s
innate ability is θL. Learning occurs only gradually because of the stochastic el-
ement εi jt in the production function. A signal about worker’s effective ability is
given by
zit =
yi jt −d j
c j
= ηit + εi jt . (5)
The expected innate ability of worker i in period t is denoted by ηeit and is given
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by
θ eit = E(θi|zit−x, . . . ,zit−1) (6)
and the effective ability is now
ηeit = θ
e
it f (xit). (7)
The worker’s wage becomes
wi jt = Eyi jt = d j+ c jηeit = d j+ c jθ
e
it f (xit). (8)
As stated in the Introduction, the Gibbons and Waldman model sets out to
explain five facts from the BGH study. Table 1 summarizes whether the two model
versions are able to generate the predictions.
Table 1: Summing up the predictions of the GW99 model. FI = Full information.
SL = symmetric learning
Prediction FI SL
1. Real wage decreases are not rare, but demotions are. No Yes
2. Wages are serially correlated. Yes Yes
3. Promotions are associated with large wage increases. “weak
form”
Yes
4. Wage increases on promotion are small relative to the dif-
ference between average wages across levels of the job ladder.
Yes Yes
5. Workers who receive large wage increases early in their
stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the
next.
Yes Yes
4 Data description
I use data from the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO). This is the main
employers’ organization in Norway. NHO has about 16,000 member companies.
73% of these companies have records for fewer than 20 person-years. The member
companies employ about 450,000 workers, mainly in construction, services and
manufacturing in Norway.9 There is a bias towards manufacturing. Many of the
9NHO (2004)
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member companies in NHO operate in export and import competing industries.
The total labor force in Norway is about 2.3 million workers, of whom about half
were employed in the public sector in the year 2000, hence the NHO cover roughly
40% of private sector employment. The members of NHO also produced about
40% of private sector GDP.
The data is based on establishment records for all white-collar workers em-
ployed by firms that are members of the NHO confederation. The data quality is
high as the wage data were a major source of information for the collective wage
bargaining process in Norway between the NHO and the unions. The data cover
on average 97,000 white-collar workers per year in different industries (although
biased towards manufacturing) during the years 1980-1997.10 CEOs (and in large
firms, vice CEO) are in principle not included. The average number of plants is
5,000 and the average number of firms is 2,700 per year. To obtain more infor-
mation we have merged the NHO with the main administrative matched employer-
employee data base assembled by Statistics Norway. This database has a rich set
of information on workers and plants for the period 1986-2002. One of the reasons
for merging the NHO data set with the administrative register, besides obtaining
more information, is that it is unclear whether the information reported in the NHO
statistics pertains to plants, firms or a combination of the two. For more detailed
information about the NHO data and the merging process, see Hunnes, Møen, and
Salvanes (2007). Because of the merging with the administrative data set, I restrict
the years used in this paper to 1987-1997.11
A great advantage of our data set is that it has information about occupations
and hierarchical levels. Each worker is assigned an occupational group and a level
within the occupational group. The groups are labeled A-F: Group A is technical
white collar workers; Group B is foremen; Group C is administration; Group D
is shops and Group E is storage. Group F is a miscellaneous group consisting of
workers that do not fit in any of the other categories. Hierarchical level is given
by a number where zero represents the top level. The number of levels varies by
group and ranges from 1 (F) to 7 (A).12 These codes are made by NHO for wage
10The year 1987 is missing. However, the data set for each year contains lagged values; hence, I
was able to reconstruct 1987 by using lagged values in the 1988 file. This is of course not a perfect
reconstruction, since I do not have information on workers who left the data set in 1987 and were not
present in the 1988 file.
11For each observation I need two years of lagged values. This implies that I also use information
from both the 1986 and 1985 files. See Section 6 for more information.
12Note that not all firms will have workers on each of the seven levels.
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bargaining purposes, and as such, they are similar across plants and industries.
In this paper I restrict the sample to look at group A (technical white collar
workers) and group C (administrative white collar workers) only. About 35% of
the workers belong to group A and about 40% belong to group C. In the estima-
tions I run separate regressions. This implies that I do not have to create a single
hierarchy within the firm across different occupations. Such a harmonization is
not straightforward.13 Further, by analyzing the two occupations separately the
estimation of the rank coefficients will not be influenced by workers who switch
ranks because they switch occupation. Some workers switch occupations e.g. from
technical jobs to administrative jobs.
The wage variable is monthly wage on September 1st including the value of
fringe benefits and excluding overtime and bonuses. Indirect costs to the plant
such as payroll tax, pensions etc are not included. I transform nominal wages to
real wages using the Consumer Price Index with base year 1997.
In creating the sample I apply the following: (1) Monthly wage should be at
least NOK 2,000 measured in 1980 kroner (to remove outliers) and I look at only
full time workers (over the age of 16), i.e. numbers of hours worked per week
should be at least 30. (2) Observations where one or several of the variables are
missing are dropped from the sample. (3) Labor market experience is potential
labor market experience. (4) Since the instruments matrices will be dominated by
columns with zeros and ones, I restrict the moves up or down along the career path
to 2 levels between each time period. In a small number of cases I do observe
workers who move between one of the two lowest levels and the highest level. For
group A, I have in addition aggregated the two highest levels into one and the two
lowest levels into one.14, 15
13One problem lies in the fact that some levels overlap with respect to responsibility in the orga-
nization. For more on this, see Hunnes, Møen, and Salvanes (2007) using the data where a single
hierarchy within the firm is created.
14By doing this, I reduce the instrument matrix Z from 49 possible instruments (i.e. interaction
terms) to 25. I also drop columns in the instrument matrix which only contains zeros. See Section 6.
15Group C has by definition 5 hierarchical levels. To make the estimation results for the two
occupational groups comparable I choose to keep all 5 ranks in the administrative group.
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5 Descriptive analysis
I start this section by presenting summary statistics by hierarchical level in Table
2.16 As expected, average wage increases along the hierarchy with the wage at
the top level being about twice the wage at the lowest level for technical workers.
For administrative workers the ratio is about 2.8. At the three lowest levels the
wages for technical workers are larger than for administrative workers, but on the
two highest levels the average wages for administrative workers are larger than for
technical workers. This is especially true for the highest level where administrative
workers earn 17.5% more than technical workers. The same pattern holds more or
less for wage increases as well. The ratio between top/bottom in the two groups
is now 2.6 and 3.6 implying that there is larger inequality in wage increases for
administrative workers.
In general, the average age for administrative workers is a bit higher than for
technical workers, except for the lowest level. And the age increases with the hier-
archical levels. For both groups years of education increase with the rank. Overall,
technical workers have one more year of schooling compared to administrative
workers. Workers on the highest level have about a 4-5 year longer education than
the workers at the lowest level.
Turning to experience, we see from the table that even if experience increases
with rank, there is, on average, no large difference between top and bottom ranks
for technical workers. For administrative workers, on the other hand, there is about
4 years difference in experience between top and bottom in the firm hierarchy. In
general, administrative workers have more experience than technical workers. But
this is not surprising since technical workers, in general, have more education.
On the two lowest levels, females are in the majority among administrative
workers. But the female share decreases with rank, for both of the two groups.
This is especially noticeable for administrative workers. Even if the female share
is 88% at the lowest level it is only 3% at the top level. It is clear that very few
women make it past middle management (level 3).
The skill index increases with the levels, and on average it is higher for admin-
istrative workers than for technical workers.17
Figure 2 shows that mean wage increases along the career path. For both groups
16In the analysis I treat all the firms as one big firm, i.e. I do not take into account firm
heterogeneity.
17See Section 6.1 for a definition of the skill index.
11
Table 2: Summary statistics (means) by level. Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level Wage ∆ wage Age Education Experience Female Skills
1 18,362 218 42.2 10.9 23.3 .23 -.27
(2,463) (889) (11.2) (1.9) (12.1) (.42) (.24)
2 21,385 379 40.7 12.6 20.1 .12 -.13
(3,069) (1,098) (10.7) (2.3) (11.9) (.33) (.25)
3 25,936 426 43.0 13.8 21.1 .07 .09
(4,210) (1,365) (9.7) (2.4) (10.8) (.25) (.30)
4 31,181 480 45.4 14.5 22.9 .05 .25
(4,415) (1,655) (9.1) (2.5) (10.1) (.22) (.33)
5 38,066 569 47.9 15.6 24.2 .03 .48
(5,833) (1,970) (8.0) (2.3) (8.6) (.16) (.35)
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level Wage ∆ wage Age Education Experience Female Skills
1 15,579 243 39.8 10.6 21.2 .88 -.19
(2,066) (852) (11.8) (1.5) (12.6) (.32) (.22)
2 18,084 262 42.2 11.0 23.2 .68 -.07
(2,476) (919) (10.7) (1.7) (11.4) (.47) (.23)
3 23,786 409 43.9 12.0 23.9 .30 .09
(4,213) (1,343) (10.0) (2.2) (11.0) (.46) (.27)
4 31,867 543 46.1 13.3 24.8 .09 .32
(6,159) (1,805) (8.7) (2.43) (9.6) (.29) (.35)
5 44,741 872 48.2 14.8 25.4 .03 .59
(8,925) (3,205) (8.0) (2.3) (8.5) (.16) (.37)
Monthly real wage in 1997 kroner. Education in years of schooling. Experience is potential experi-
ence, that is, age minus years of schooling minus 7. Skills are given by the skill index, see Section
6.1
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Figure 2: Average monthly real wage by hierarchical level.
the following is true: (1) There is large wage variation within a given level, and
the standard deviation increases with the ranks. In other words, wage inequality
within a given level increases along the career path. (2) There is considerable
overlap between the wage intervals in the different hierarchical levels, which is in
line with previous findings, see e.g. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a). The
figure also reveals that the (level, wage)–curve is more convex for administrative
than for technical workers. This implies that administrative workers are faced with
more wage inequality between the ranks than technical workers. Also notice that
both the average wage and its standard deviation are much larger for administrative
workers at the two top levels.
The rest of the descriptive analysis is organized around the five predictions that
the Gibbons and Waldman (1999b)–model generates. By looking for evidence of
the predictions in the sample, one can get a sense of whether the data will support
the GW99 model or not.
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Are real wage decreases rare? Real wage decreases are not rare as docu-
mented by Table 3. The fraction of workers who received a real wage decrease
differed from as few as 6–9% in 1996 to as many as 76–80% in 1988, a reces-
sion year. One interesting observation is that during the late 80s the higher levels
are more affected by real wage decreases than the lower levels. The fraction of
workers who experienced a real wage decrease more or less increases with the hi-
erarchy. This was a period with increasing unemployment and a downturn in the
Norwegian economy. From 1991 and onwards it seems as if the top levels are those
least affected by real wage decreases, at least for technical workers. Comparing the
means for the two occupational groups, it seems as if there is a larger fraction of
administrative workers experiencing real wage decreases. The bottom line is that
real wage decreases are not rare.
Are demotions rare? In Table 4 I show all the within firm mobility during the
years studied.18 The diagonal elements show the percentage of the workers who in
a given level stay at that level. I define a promotion as a change from one level to a
higher level.19 The percentage promoted is given above the diagonal while the per-
centage of workers who got a demotion is given below the diagonal. Overall, I ob-
serve a mobility rate, i.e. change in ranks, of 9.21% (technical workers) and 8.83%
(administrative workers). If we split these two numbers into demotion/promotion,
we get 2.51/6.70% and 3.52/5.31%. In other words, there is a higher mobility rate
for technical workers and they have a higher promotion and a lower demotion rate
as compared to administrative workers. Looking at Table 4, we see that the demo-
tion rate from a given level is about 2–4% for technical workers and about 3–8%
for administrative workers. These numbers are not very different from those found
in previous studies. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a) find that demotions and
lateral transfers are rare. Seltzer and Merrett (2000) find that 6.96% of the transi-
tions were promotions and 3.33% were demotions (“demotion was just an ordinary
part of job rotation”). Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004) find an annual pro-
motion rate of 5.6% and demotion rate of 1.6%. Lazear (1999) find a great deal
of downward mobility. McCue (1996) find that of the 20% who are mobile in her
data, almost half move within the firm, and about half of these are considered pro-
18Note that the last row for each group gives the distribution of the workers on the different ranks.
19See Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw (2006) for a nice (but short) overview of different defini-
tions of promotions that are being used in empirical literature.
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Table 3: Fraction of workers who had a real wage decrease from t − 1 to t by
hierarchical level.
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Year Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 mean
1987 .73 .69 .71 .77 .82 .75
1988 .80 .76 .79 .82 .82 .80
1989 .53 .62 .64 .70 .71 .64
1990 .20 .27 .27 .23 .23 .24
1991 .31 .29 .29 .29 .22 .28
1992 .42 .34 .35 .35 .30 .35
1993 .43 .35 .33 .35 .32 .36
1994 .16 .15 .17 .17 .17 .16
1995 .20 .22 .26 .22 .21 .22
1996 .07 .06 .06 .05 .04 .06
1997 .16 .14 .13 .12 .10 .13
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Year Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 mean
1987 .59 .69 .65 .65 .67 .65
1988 .73 .76 .79 .75 .76 .76
1989 .48 .58 .72 .77 .82 .67
1990 .19 .24 .29 .30 .33 .27
1991 .27 .28 .34 .31 .28 .30
1992 .40 .39 .41 .42 .43 .41
1993 .46 .39 .41 .42 .40 .42
1994 .18 .18 .18 .18 .17 .18
1995 .23 .26 .27 .24 .28 .26
1996 .09 .08 .09 .10 .09 .09
1997 .23 .25 .19 .16 .22 .21
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motions. In the study by Pergamit and Veum (1999), 24% of the workers reported
a promotion at their firm the previous year, but many of the promotions did not
involve any change in duties or position. Grund (2005) study a firm with plants
in two different countries and finds a promotion rate of 1.2% in the German plant
and 8.4% in the US plant. Belzil and Bognanno (2005) find that promotions are
slightly more frequent than demotions making the authors conclude (p. 10) “It is
evident [...] that, contrary to conventional wisdom, demotions are frequent enough
to merit attention.”
Table 4: Within firm mobility. The diagonal elements show the percentage of the
workers who in a given level stay at that level. Promotions (demotions) are given
above (below) the diagonal.
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 91.49% 7.40 1.10 .00 .00 100.00
2 2.04 87.23 10.16 .57 .00 100.00
3 .15 2.30 91.66 5.50 .39 100.00
4 .00 .21 3.96 89.73 6.10 100.00
5 .00 .00 .50 3.61 95.89 100.00
Total 14.00 20.24 34.67 19.54 11.56 100.00
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 87.34% 11.97 .68 .00 .00 100.00
2 3.05 92.19 4.59 .17 .00 100.00
3 .13 4.62 90.67 4.53 .04 100.00
4 .00 .19 5.04 93.07 1.69 100.00
5 .00 .00 .18 7.60 92.22 100.00
Total 14.95 38.04 27.04 17.46 2.51 100.00
Are wage increases serially correlated? One of the findings in Baker, Gibbs,
and Holmstrom (1994a,b) was positive serial correlation in wage increases even
after controlling for observable characteristics. To study this question, I restrict
my observations to a balanced panel over 11 years and follow 3,798 technical and
16
4,601 administrative workers over the years 1987–1997. The correlations in resid-
ual percentage real wage increase are given in Table 5. The controls in the OLS
are education, gender, age, hierarchical level, sector and year dummies. For both
occupations, there is, with three exceptions, statistical significant negative corre-
lation between increase in year t and increase in year t− 1. In many cases there
is also statistical significant correlation beyond last year. If we look at technical
workers and take 1996 as the “base year” we see that there are statistical signifi-
cant correlations for all the years back to 1988 except for 1991. On the other hand,
using 1991 as the “base year” there is no statistical significant correlation between
the real wage increase residuals in 1990 and 1991, but positive correlation between
1991 and 1989. For both occupations, the overall pattern from Table 5 is a negative
correlation between this years real wage increase residuals and last years residuals
and in most cases, there are also statistical significant correlations further back in
time. But with correlations between t and t− i with i > 1 it is difficult to find any
systematic pattern in the sign and statistical significance of the correlations.20 One
possible explanation for negative serial correlation may be institutional settings,
in particular collective wage agreements. It is not uncommon that the agreements
favor different groups of workers in different years. If one group of workers gets
a large wage increase this year at the expense of other workers it is plausible that
this group gets less next year. Negative correlation is also found in Gibbs and
Hendricks (2004) for the wage system that roughly “covered white–collar profes-
sional or managerial jobs.” But, as the authors argue “[negative serial correlation]
is inconsistent with an interpretation based on differences in rates of human capital
accumulation.”21 Using panel data techniques, Belzil and Bognanno (2005) find
that “current compensation growth is [...] negatively correlated with past compen-
sation growth.” Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw (2006) and Dohmen (2004) find
positive serial correlation in their studies, while Lluis (2005) find no evidence of
serial correlation. In other words, the empirical evidence is mixed.
Are promotions associated with large wage increases? Tables 6 and 7
show the wage level and wage change (respectively) and the levels with or without
a move in the hierarchy. The tables show that workers who get promoted earn a
20Regardless of statistical significance, about 50% of the correlations in the table are negative.
21See Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) for a detailed discussion of sources of serial correlations. One
possible source of negative serial correlation is measurement error. They discuss this case and it is
not a plausible explanation in my case either because of the way the data is collected, cfr. Section 4.
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higher wage and get a promotion premium (on average) compared to those who
do not move.22 Looking at Table 7 it is clear that a wage change associated with
a promotion is significantly larger that a wage change for a worker who does not
change position. This fact is in line with previous research. If a technical worker
at level 4 stays in that level he gets a wage change of NOK 370 but if promoted the
wage increase is NOK 1,400. The table also reveals that in most cases demotions
are associated with a decrease in (real) wages.
Are wage increases on promotion small relative to the difference be-
tween average wages across levels of the job ladder? When looking at
this prediction, I apply the methodology used in Gibbs and Hendricks (2004). Let
us define an employee’s location in the wage range within a given level in a given
year (location) as the percentage distance from the lowest observed wage (min) to
the highest observed wage (max) in that level. Formally,
location= 100
wage−min
max−min ∈ [0,100]. (9)
Table 8 shows the effect of a promotion on the location in the wage range.23
The first thing to notice is that workers who are promoted come from all parts of the
wage distribution. But most of them, roughly 60% and 54%, come from the lower
part of the distribution (looking at the column marked N). The overall evidence
from the table is clear: the workers are promoted into a lower location at their new
level than the location they had at the previous level. Administrative workers with
a location parameter below 40 the common pattern is to either stay in the same
location range or get into a higher location range.
The last column of the table shows percentage wage increase upon promotion
divided by the percentage difference in mean wage between the old and the new
hierarchical level. Overall, this ratio is about .20. When a worker is promoted
the wage increase associated with a promotion is about 20% of the difference in
22In the sample there are 13,549 observations of promotions for technical workers and 12,062
for administrative workers. About 20% (2,627 and 2,690 workers) of these actually receive a real
wage decrease upon promotion. An interesting question is of course why we observe this. One
possible (although not verified) explanation could be a trade-off between status and wages. See e.g.
Cardoso (2005) who find suggestive evidence of such a trade-off using Portuguese data for the years
1991–2000.
23Since the location parameter can take on all values between 0 and 100, I have made 10 groups
to make the table manageable.
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Table 6: Monthly real wage by level in t−1 and level in t. Standard deviation in
parenthesis.
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 18,316 19,855 23,126 . . 18,483
(2,439) (2,341) (3,449) . . (2,527)
2 19,432 21,415 23,613 28,121 . 21,636
(2,623) (3,045) (3,280) (4,268) . (3,194)
3 21,417 22,562 26,037 29,477 33,727 26,170
(3,231) (3,457) (4,182) (4,056) (5,294) (4,302)
4 . 26,057 28,463 31,346 34,966 31,442
. (4,611 ) (4,608) (4,389) (4,383) (4,530)
5 . . 32,087 33,132 38,475 38,250
. . (5,712) (4,772) (5,855) (5,920)
Total 18,362 21,385 25,937 31,181 38,066 26,381
(2,463) (3,069) (4,210) (4,415) (5,833) (7,145)
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 15,543 16,730 18,716 . . 15,707
(2,042) (2,170) (3,015) . . (2,116)
2 15,972 18,121 21,371 24,162 . 18,215
(2,271) (2,454) (3,105) (4,255) . (2,620)
3 16,685 19,017 23,920 29,134 35,330 23,924
(2,581) (2,696) (4,190) (4,819) (8,530) (4,450)
4 . 20,766 25,484 32,057 41,334 31,860
. (3,270) (4,714) (6,166) (7,164) (6,422)
5 . . 25,472 36,248 45,233 44,514
. . (5,169) (6,492) (9,015) (9,193)
Total 15,579 18,084 23,786 31,867 44,741 22,327
(2,066) (2,476) (4,213) (6,159) (8,925) (7,689)
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Table 7: Real wage change by level in t− 1 and t. Standard deviation in paren-
thesis.
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 223 868 1,857 . . 289
(878) (1,171) (2,594) . . (968)
2 92 364 1,179 2,702 . 455
(1,029) (1,070) (1,575) (3,231) . (1,193)
3 -70 103 380 1,514 2,768 445
(1,861) (1,285) (1,306) (2,127) (3,855) (1,416)
4 . -632 -10 369 1,408 415
. (2,517) (1,639) (1,513) (2,533) (1,624)
5 . . -734 -337 445 411
. . (3,127) (1,895) (1,814) (1,833)
Total 218 379 426 480 569 414
(889) (1,098) (1,365) (1,655) (1,970) (1,412)
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 248 753 1,666 . . 318
(827) (1,205) (2,255) . . (919)
2 200 247 1,309 3,405 . 299
(1,078) (869) (1,862) (3,958) . (992)
3 -578 -9 357 1,821 6,796 408
(1,527) (1,137) (1,244) (2,514) (5,274) (1,371)
4 . -1,655 -66 446 2,687 454
. (4,674) (1,683) (1,654) (4,217) (1,771)
5 . . -4,081 -469 607 516
. . (6,430) (2,925) (2,924) (2,953)
Total 243 262 409 543 872 363
(852) (919) (1,343) (1,805) (3,205) (1,328)
21
the mean wage between the two levels. This supports the evidence on the location
mobility. The general pattern is that the ratio is decreasing with the increase in the
location parameter prior to promotion. For the three highest location parameters
the ratio is below .10.
Are wage increases a predictor for promotion? To see whether or not a wage
increase is a predictor for promotion I have run a probit model. The estimation
results are reported in Table 9. For both occupations there is a positive relationship
between percentage real wage change for both one and two lags back in time and
the probability of getting a promotion. The effect for technical workers is larger
than for administrative workers for the first lag, but when looking at the second lag
it is the other way around. However, the marginal effects, computed at the mean,
are very small for both occupations. The marginal effects more or less increase
relative to where in the distribution I compute the marginals. An assumed real
wage increase of 10% changes the marginal effects to .0021 (.00009 for the second
lag) and .0001 (.0001) for the two occupations. In other words, even if the numbers
increase they are of no practical significance. This implies that the wage increase
is not a good predictor for promotion, at least when looking back one or two time
periods.
Summing up The descriptive analysis suggests that: (1) Real wage decreases
are not rare. Demotions occur less often, but are not truly rare. (2) There is nega-
tive serial correlation in wages after controlling for observables between the wage
increase in this period and the wage increase in the previous time period. (3) Pro-
motions are associated with large wage increases. (4) Wage increases on promotion
are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job
ladder. (5) There is a positive relationship between lagged wage increases and
promotion. But the effect is of no practical significance.
The conclusion is that there is support in the data for most of the predictions in
the model. Hence, the data set should be suitable for estimating the GW99 model.
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Table 9: Results from a probit estimation. Dependent variable is promotion.
Marginal effect (at mean) for % wage change in square brackets. Robust standard
error in parenthesis.
Technical Administrative
white collar workers white collar workers
1 lag %wage change .0065∗∗∗ [.00019] .0059∗∗∗ [.0001]
(.0013) (.0012)
2 lags %wage change .0029∗∗ [.00008] .0045∗∗∗ [.0001]
(.0012) (.0012)
female .1876∗∗∗ .4035∗∗∗
(.0249) (.0162)
age -.0395∗∗∗ -.0272∗∗∗
(.0011) (.0009)
edu -.0715∗∗∗ -.0665∗∗∗
(.0031) (.0037)
level dummies yes yes
year dummies yes yes
sector dummies yes yes
N 104,035 119,706
Pesudo R2 .1179 .1034
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level.
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6 Econometric setup
In explaining the econometric setup I draw heavily on Lluis (2005) and Gibbons,
Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005).24
The wage equation in the model is given by
wi jt = d j+ c jθ eit f (xit). (10)
Let Ri jt be dummy variables indicating worker i’s rank j at time t. Let Xit be
a vector with observable characteristics of the worker25 and µit an error term. The
equation I will estimate is
wi jt =
J
∑
j=1
Ri jtd j+
J
∑
j=1
Ri jtXitb j+
J
∑
j=1
Ri jtc jθ eit f (xit)+µit . (11)
As Lluis (2005) points out ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates will be incon-
sistent. The rank assignment is endogenous based on θ eit , making θ eit correlated
with the rank dummies. Further, θ eit introduces another challenge by being inter-
acted with the Ri jt terms and, thus, can not be eliminated by first differencing the
wage equation. Note, however, that fixed-effect models can be applied if one as-
sumes that (1) the unobserved heterogeneity term is not time varying, and (2) the
heterogeneity is equally valued in the different ranks. This assumption is made
throughout the study by Lima and Pereira (2003).
Quasi-differencing the equation It is possible to eliminated θ eit from Equa-
tion (11) by using a quasi-differencing technique.26 First solve Equation (11) with
24Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005) write on page 684: “Although our empirical work
explores two standard definitions of sectors (i.e., occupations and industries), other definitions are
possible. For example, sectors could be jobs inside a firm [...], states or regions within a country [...],
or entire countries [...].”
25Later in the paper I will summarize all the observable characteristics of the worker in a skill
index in order to (significantly) reduce the number of parameters to be estimated (each observable
characteristic is interacted with the hierarchical levels). See Section 6.1.
26This technique is first employed in Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) who look at models
where the fixed effect is interacted with year dummies. Lemieux (1998) uses this technique when
he estimates a model where the return to the fixed effect is different in the union and the non-union
sectors. Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005) estimate models in which the fixed effect is
differently valued in different sectors of the economy. Finally, Lluis (2005) employs the methodology
when she estimates the Gibbons-Waldman model using German data.
25
respect to θ eit
θ eit =
wi jt −∑Jj=1Ri jtd j−∑Jj=1Ri jtXitb j−µit
∑Jj=1Ri jtc j f (xit)
. (12)
Then we use the property that the expected innate ability follows a martingale
process.
θ eit = θ
e
it−1+uit , (13)
where uit is assumed orthogonal to θ eit−1. Substituting Equation (12) and its lagged
version into Equation (13) we obtain
wi jt
∑Jj=1Ri jtc j f (xit)
=
wi jt−1
∑JJ=1Ri jt−1c j f (xi jt−1)
(14)
+
∑JJ=1Ri jtd j+∑
J
J=1Ri jtXitb j
∑JJ=1Ri jtc j f (xit)
− 1
∑JJ=1Ri jt−1c j f (xi jt−1)
[
J
∑
J=1
Ri jt−1d j+
J
∑
J=1
Ri jt−1Xit−1b j
]
+ εit
where
εit = uit +
µit
∑JJ=1Ri jtc j f (xit)
− µit−1
∑JJ=1Ri jt−1c j f (xi jt−1)
. (15)
Equation (14) is the one to be estimated.
In the model without learning it is possible to take the lagged version of Equa-
tion (12) and substitute into Equation (11) since θ eit = θ eit−1. This implies that uit
drops from Equation (15).
The quasi-differencing corrects the endogeneity in the assignment of workers
to the ranks, but it is not possible to estimate Equation (14) using nonlinear least
squares because of further endogeneity problems (Lluis, 2005). First, wi jt−1 is
correlated with µit−1. Second, in the model with learning uit , i.e. the new infor-
mation in the learning process about innate ability at time t, is correlated with Ri jt ,
since beliefs about ability influence the current rank assignment. To get consis-
tent estimates one must correct for these endogeneity problems by choosing valid
instruments for wi jt−1 and Ri jt .
Full information In the model with full information, the random shock uit in
the learning process drops from the martingale θ eit = θ eit−1+ uit , and hence, drops
from Equation (15). The quasi-differencing method corrects for the endogeneity
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in the assignment of workers to job ranks. But since wi jt−1 is correlated with µit−1
we must find a suitable instrument for wi jt−1. The instrument must be (highly)
correlated with the wage, but not correlated with the error term. In explaining the
choice of instruments it is helpful to look at Figure 1. Assume two workers A and
B with θA = H and θB = L (H > L) and the same labor market experience. Their
wages are different because θA 6= θB. More specifically wAt > wBt since θA > θB.
Information on contemporaneous rank assignment is not enough to identify wage
differences. But worker A’s effective ability ηAt = θA f (xAt) may be at the level
of effective ability to get promoted next period. In other words, having informa-
tion on the worker’s contemporaneous rank and his rank in the next period gives
information about the ability level and, hence, on his wage. In the model with full
information it is possible to use the interaction terms between Ri jt−1 and Ri jt as
instruments.
Symmetric learning The mobility in the model is driven by the learning pro-
cess, hence Ri jt is correlated with the new information uit . Recall that θ eit = θ eit−1+
uit . This implies that Ri jt must be instrumented in addition to wi jt−1. Because of
the martingale process, Ri jt−1 and Ri jt−2 is not correlated with uit since current
rank is only affected by uit . The instrument we are looking for should therefore
help identify differences in ability from one period to the next. As argued in Lluis
(2005), the interaction between Ri jt−1 and Ri jt−2 “constitutes a good predictor of
current rank affiliation because it helps identify differences in expected ability in
period t− 1 (using the same argument as in the perfect information case) as well
as in period t.”
Looking at Equation 14, we see that there are interaction terms between the
rank indicator and the skill index and between the rank indicator and the labor
market experience. But since Ri jt is endogenous in the learning case, I instrument
this variable with Ri jt−2. In other words, I include the interaction between the skill
index and the levels and the experience and the levels in the instrument matrix Z.27
Table 10 sums up the discussion of the instruments.
To estimate Equation (14) I apply a GMM estimator in which the set of instru-
27Note that Lluis (2005) also includes these instruments when estimating the model without learn-
ing only using Ri jt instead of Ri jt−2. This is not necessary since Ri jt is not endogenous in that
case. To be more precise, the quasi-differencing takes care of the endogeneity problem with the rank
assignment in the model without learning, as explained above.
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Table 10: Variables in the instrument matrix Z. SI is the skill index and E is
experience.
Full information Symmetric learning
Endogenous variables wi jt−1 wi jt−1
Ri jt
SI×Ri jt
E×Ri jt
Instrument matrix Z Ri jt ×Ri jt−1 Ri jt−1×Ri jt−2
SI×Ri jt−2
E×Ri jt−2
ments Zi must satisfy the usual orthogonality condition
E[εiZi] = 0. (16)
The objective function in the minimization problem is given by
min
γ
ε(γ)′Z(Z′ΩZ)−1Z′ε(γ) (17)
where γ is the parameter vector.28
Lluis (2005) applying the same estimation procedure, imposes the following
normalization on the minimization problem
1
TN
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
θ eit = 0 (18)
where N is the number of individuals, T is the number of time periods (number of
observations) for each individual, and
θ eit =
wi jt −∑Jj=1Ri jtd j−∑Jj=1Ri jtXitb j
∑Jj=1Ri jtc j f (xit)
. (19)
According to Lluis (2005) this normalization to zero is necessary for the parameters
to be identified.29
28The estimation is carried out in SAS v. 9.1. using the proc model procedure in the SAS/ETS
package.
29She refers the reader to Lemieux (1993, 1998). This normalization is not explicitly discussed in
Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005).
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6.1 From econometric setup to practical implementation
Equation (14), is complex and it is necessary to make several simplifying assump-
tions to estimate the model.
Skill index Xit is a vector with observable characteristics of the worker that is
interacted with the hierarchical levels. To restrict the number of parameters to be
estimated, I summarize these observable characteristics by a skill index. A similar
approach is taken in Lluis (2005) and Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005).
The skill index is constructed as follows: Log monthly wage is regressed on years
of education, experience and squared experience, marriage, and dummies for year
(12), gender and industries (7). The skill index is then defined as predicted wage in
levels based solely on the coefficients of education and experience.30 Finally, the
skill index is normalized with a mean of zero.
Functional form for f (xit) Lluis (2005, p. 735) argues that a natural choice for
the accumulated labor market function f (xit) is
f (xit) = exp(α0+α1xit +α2x2it). (20)
In the estimation, however, she ends up replacing this expression with f (xit) = 1.
“For any other functional forms where f varies with experience, the parameters of
the f function could not be estimated” (p. 753). I experience the same problem,
and follow Lluis’ solution. Restricting f (xit) to one implies that we take away
the dynamics in the model in the no-learning case. The wage equation changes
from wi jt = d j + c jθi f (xit) to wi jt = d j + c jθi and effective ability changes from
ηit = θi f (xit) to ηit = θi = ηi. In other words, we assume that the assignment of
workers to jobs is based on the workers innate ability only. Unless the thresholds
for a promotion (η j) changes, the worker is not assigned to a new position.
The simplification above has implications for the instrumental matrix. With
f (xit) = 1 it is not necessary to instrument the interaction between f (xit) and cur-
rent rank.
30I use wage in levels to get consistency with the GW99 model specification.
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7 Results
7.1 Ranks, measured skills and unobserved ability
I start the analysis by presenting some simple regressions. In column 1 of Table 11
I have estimated monthly wage in NOK 10,000 on the hierarchical levels (no other
controls included). The first thing to notice is that the rank variables explain about
70% of the variation in monthly wage implying that the rank variable is important
in explaining a worker’s wage. This supports the claim that in internal labor mar-
kets wages are strongly attached to the hierarchical levels. All the coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% level. In column 2 I have added the skill variable
(see Section 6.1 for the definition) as a control. Controlling for the workers’ mea-
sured skills reduces the impact of the ranks somewhat, but still the rank dummies
are statistically significant and increase with the hierarchical levels. The size of the
skill parameter is about the same as the dummy for the middle rank. In the last
column of the table I have used the fixed effects estimator. This implies that, con-
trary to the theoretical model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999b), I assume that the
unobserved ability is constant over time and is rewarded the same in each hierar-
chical level. The results show that unobserved ability is important. The size of the
rank dummies, however, is significantly smaller than when applying OLS. Hence,
it is important to control for unobserved ability. Also note that when controlling
for unobserved ability, the importance of the observed part of the skills more than
doubles.
7.2 Comparative advantage based on measurable skills only
Comparative advantage implies that skills are rewarded differently along the firm’s
job ladder and that workers are sorted by their skills and ability into a given position
in the firm hierarchy. Empirically I can test this by first estimating the Gibbons-
Waldman model as outlined in Section 6 and then use a Wald test statistic to test
whether the slopes in the model (i.e. the b j’s and c j’s coefficients) are different
from one another.
I start by presenting evidence on comparative advantage based on measurable
skills (the b j’s) only. I do this by estimating a simple OLS model where I have
interacted the skill index with the hierarchical levels. Instead of a Wald test it is
now possible to use the standard F test.
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Table 11: Rank wage differentials.
Specification no. (1) (2) (3)
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level 2 .302∗∗∗ .218∗∗∗ .066∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.003)
Level 3 .757∗∗∗ .543∗∗∗ .166∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.004)
Level 4 1.282∗∗∗ .970∗∗∗ .332∗∗∗
(.003) (.003) (.005)
Level 5 1.969∗∗∗ 1.521∗∗∗ .563∗∗∗
(.004) (.005) (.008)
skills .602∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗
(.003) (.011)
N 202142 202142 202142
R2 .674 .736 .485
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level 2 .250∗∗∗ .185∗∗∗ .044∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.002)
Level 3 .821∗∗∗ .663∗∗∗ .166∗∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.003)
Level 4 1.629∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗ .370∗∗∗
(.003) (.003) (.005)
Level 5 2.916∗∗∗ 2.477∗∗∗ .762∗∗∗
(.012) (.012) (.015)
skills .566∗∗∗ 1.342∗∗∗
(.004) (.010)
N 227077 227077 227077
R2 .723 .761 .343
Dependent variable: monthly wage in NOK 10,000. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Base
group: level 1. Note that the within R2 is reported for the fixed effect model, specification (3).
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level.
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Technical white collar workers Table 12 shows that all the coefficients are sta-
tistically significant. The size of the b j coefficients increase up to level three and
then decrease (inverse U-shape). This means that measured skills, i.e. education
and experience, are most important in level three. But even if the importance of
measured skills are less in the two top levels compared to level three, their esti-
mated coefficients are still larger than in the two lowest levels. The comparative
advantage hypothesis has support since the joint test of equalities in the slopes and
all the pair-wise tests reject the null hypothesis.31
Administrative white collar workers The results for administrative workers
follows the same pattern as for technical workers with the exception that measured
skills increase up to level four and then decline. Further, the size of the coefficients
for the b j’s are smaller for administrative workers than for technical workers for
the three lowest levels. This means that the return to the skill index is higher for
technical than for administrative workers at the lower ranks, but lower at the top
level.
7.3 Comparative advantage based on both measured and unmeasured
skills
In addition to measurable skills we now enrich the estimation by also controlling
for unmeasured skills, but no learning (i.e. the full information case in GW99).
Technical white collar workers The first panel in Table 13 shows the estima-
tion results of the model with comparative advantage using both measurable (the
b j’s) and unmeasurable skills (the c j’s), but without learning. First we notice how
well the parameter estimates of the c j’s fit the theoretical parameter bounds. From
Section 3 we remember that cJ > cJ−1 > .. . > c1 > 0 with J= 5 in our case. All the
parameter estimates are statistically significant with p-values below .0001 except
for the parameter d5 which is not significant (p-value of .446). Along the career
path we see that the unmeasured skills (the c j’s) increases, suggesting, as sus-
pected, that the worker’s unmeasured skills become more important as the worker
climbs the hierarchy. One more unit of unmeasured skill at the top level is valued
almost four times as much as at the lowest hierarchical level.
31The H0 for the joint test is that all of the pair-wise slopes are equal.
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Table 12: Comparative advantage based on measurable skills only.
Level 1 2 3 4 5
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .26∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗
. (.003) (.003) (.003) (.007)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.37∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗ .74∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗
(.006) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.011)
Tests for equality:
b j’s joint b2 = b1 b3 = b2 b4 = b3 b5 = b4
F-statistic 611.45 140.82 978.04 179.47 75.55
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .000)
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .23∗∗∗ .72∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗
. (.002) (.002) (.004) (.021)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.25∗∗∗ .35∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .82∗∗∗ .58∗∗∗
(.005) (.004) (.006) (.008) (.032)
Tests for equality:
b j’s joint b2 = b1 b3 = b2 b4 = b3 b5 = b4
F-statistic 1,200.81 261.32 1,263.41 399.46 53.10
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level.
Dependent variable is monthly real wage in 1,000. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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As already noted in the beginning of this section, the comparative advantage
hypothesis suggests different rewards for skills at different hierarchical levels. The
table also shows that all the formal statistical tests for equality reject the null hy-
pothesis of equality in the slope coefficients. In other words, we have support for
the comparative advantage hypothesis when looking at unmeasured skills. The
same story can be told about measured skills (the b j’s). Measured skills also be-
come more important as the worker climbs the job ladder. Compared to the OLS
case (Table 12) the size of the estimated measured skills coefficients is larger and
they increase in a monotonic way with the hierarchical levels.
The largest change in the parameter values for measured skills is from level 4
to level 5. For unmeasured skills the largest change is between level 3 and 4. These
two “kinks” for measurable skills and unmeasurable skills can be interpreted (in the
language of BGH) as critical choke points in the career path. If a worker wants to
climb the corporate ladder he or she must face a higher demand for both measurable
and unmeasurable skills. In other words, the competition for higher jobs increase
along the career path, and the best workers are selected into the highest ranks. Also
note that the pure rank effects (the d j’s) are all statistically significant and larger
than zero. This means that there is some other mechanism going on in addition to
measurable and unmeasurable skills in explaining wage increases and mobility.
Administrative white collar workers The estimation results for the no learning
case is reported in Table 13. All the estimated coefficients are statistical significant
at the 1%-level except for the parameter d5 which is significant at the 5%-level.
The coefficients for both measurable and unmeasurable skills increase along the
career path. This means that these skills are becoming more important for the
workers’ output as they climb the career ladder. Compared to the technical white
collar worker sample, the size of these coefficients are larger meaning that the
return to both measurable (the b j’s) and unmeasured (the c j’s) skills are higher for
administrative workers than for technical workers. All the equality tests reject the
null hypothesis and, hence, stress the importance of comparative advantage in the
allocation of workers to the jobs.
7.4 Comparative advantage and learning
Now we deviate from the full information case in GW99 and allow firms to learn
about their workers’ ability.
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Table 13: Results comparative advantage.
Level 1 2 3 4 5
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .116∗∗∗ .197∗∗∗ .203∗∗∗ .028
. (.011) (.011) (.012) (.037)
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 1.374∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗ 2.977∗∗∗ 3.732∗∗∗
. (.064) (.093) (.223) (.344)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
1.201∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 2.109∗∗∗
(.026) (.020) (.019) (.036) (.066)
Tests for equality:
c j’s joint c2 = c1 c3 = c2 c4 = c3 c5 = c4
χ2 statistic 97.71 34.53 55.64 45.14 12.36
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0004
b j’s joint b2 = b1 b3 = b2 b4 = b3 b5 = b4
χ2 statistic 202.18 22.62 10.85 13.10 49.00
p-value .0001 .0001 .0010 .0003 .0001
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .122∗∗∗ .222∗∗∗ .122∗∗∗ -.347∗∗
. (.008) (.009) (.016) (.141)
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 1.632∗∗∗ 2.405∗∗∗ 3.492∗∗∗ 4.685∗∗∗
. (.072) (.121) (.234) (.412)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
1.278∗∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗ 2.062∗∗∗ 2.728∗∗∗ 3.737∗∗∗
(.025) (.020) (.033) (.056) (.283)
Tests for equality:
c j’s joint c2 = c1 c3 = c2 c4 = c3 c5 = c4
χ2 statistic 154.50 76.25 128.46 43.67 18.60
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
b j’s joint b2 = b1 b3 = b2 b4 = b3 b5 = b4
χ2 statistic 824.42 37.83 237.31 106.63 12.35
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0004
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level.
Dependent variable is monthly real wage in 1,000. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Technical white collar workers Table 14 shows the estimation results. Even
if most of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant they are much less
systematic than in the case with comparative advantage only. The parameters d2,
d5, c2 and b2 are not statistically significant. The other parameters are significant
at the 1% significance level. Ignoring c2 and b2, which are not statistically sig-
nificant, we again see that the parameters for both measurable and unmeasurable
skills increase with the levels. Both the joint tests for equality in the slopes re-
ject the null hypothesis about equality and, hence, give support to the comparative
advantage and learning case. However, all the individual tests for equality fail to
reject the null when looking at the measurable part of the skills. In other words,
there is no support for the comparative advantage based on measurable skills. For
the unmeasurable part of skill, it seems that the comparative advantage and learning
hypothesis get support at the top levels of the hierarchy. This implies that learning
about workers’ unmeasurable skills is important at the top levels, but not at lower
levels.
Administrative white collar workers The lower part of Table 14 shows the
estimates for the model with learning for administrative white collar workers. All
the parameters are statistically significant at the 1%-level which was not the case
for the sample consisting of technical workers. The parameters for measurable and
unmeasurable skills do not increase in the same monotonic way as in the model
without learning. Statistically speaking, both versions of the model fit the admin-
istrative worker sample very well. However, the model with learning does not fit
the structure of the model (increasing b j’s and c j’s along the hierarchy) as well as
the model without learning.
The joint equality test for both measurable and unmeasurable skills gives sup-
port for firms learning about the workers. The individual tests for measurable skills
all reject the null hypothesis giving support to selection based on comparative ad-
vantage and learning. Recall that none of the individual tests for equality hold for
the b j’s in the technical white collar sample. Two of the four individual tests for un-
measurable skills reject the null hypothesis about equality in the slope parameters.
This means that we have partial support for the learning model, at least between
rank 1 and 2 and between rank 3 and 4.
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Table 14: Results comparative advantage and learning.
Level 1 2 3 4 5
Technical white collar workers (N = 202,142)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. 1.132 .505∗∗∗ .520∗∗∗ -.073
. (1.294) (.064) (.146) .505
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 16.203 5.135∗∗∗ 9.445∗∗∗ 28.102∗∗∗
. (28.005) (.997) (2.319) (8.784)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.679∗∗∗ 3.507 1.435∗∗∗ 1.513∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗
(.046) (4.530) (.047) (.069) (.141)
Tests for equality:
c j’s joint c2 = c1 c3 = c2 c4 = c3 c5 = c4
χ2 statistic 18.85 .29 .16 7.05 6.53
p-value .0008 .5872 .6891 .0079 .0106
b j’s joint b2 = b1 b3 = b2 b4 = b3 b5 = b4
χ2 statistic 311.09 .38 .21 .75 .73
p-value .0001 .5357 .6497 .3862 .3941
Administrative white collar workers (N = 227,077)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .734∗∗∗ .579∗∗∗ .288∗∗∗ .500∗∗∗
. (.086) (.018) (.061) (.156)
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 14.946∗∗∗ 10.106∗∗∗ 24.885∗∗∗ 24.133∗∗∗
. (4.028) (1.591) (5.777) (6.070)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.548∗∗∗ 3.658∗∗∗ 2.070∗∗∗ 2.749∗∗∗ 1.571∗∗∗
(.021) (.665) (.081) (.158) (.366)
Tests for equality:
c j’s joint c2 = c1 c3 = c2 c4 = c3 c5 = c4
χ2 statistic 33.42 11.99 2.28 9.84 .04
p-value .0001 .0005 .1313 .0017 .8391
b j’s joint b2 = b1 b3 = b2 b4 = b3 b5 = b4
χ2 statistic 639.25 20.99 5.61 12.13 8.71
p-value .0001 .0001 .0178 .0005 .0032
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level.
Dependent variable is monthly real wage in 1,000. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Robustness To check for robustness in the technical white collar sample I have
used two different subsamples. The first included, in addition to stayers, workers
who moved between firms. Overall the previous results hold. The second sample
was restricted to workers under the age of 35. This restriction is based on the hy-
pothesis that firms learn most about workers early in their careers. In the model
without learning, there were two more parameters not statistically significant com-
pared to the main sample. But overall this subsample did not produce any new
insight. It was not possible to get convergence in the model with learning.
I did the same robustness checks for the administrative white collar worker
sample with similar results. In the sample including movers between firms the
individual test for c2 = c3 (p-value =.0936) in the learning case also rejected the
H0. This was not the case when looking at only internal mobility. In other words,
there is even more support for learning when including movers between firms. For
young workers (age not greater than 35) the test c4 = c5 (p-value = .1438) no longer
rejected the H0 in the full information case. As in the case of young technical
workers, it was not possible to get convergence in the model with learning.
8 Summary and conclusion
In this paper I have used a large data set of white collar workers in Norway during
the years 1987–1997 to study wage and promotion dynamics within firms.
Through a comprehensive descriptive analysis I have shown that (1) Real wage
decreases are not rare. Demotions occur less often, but are not truly rare. (2) There
is negative serial correlation in wages after controlling for observables between
the wage increase in this period and the wage increase in the previous time pe-
riod. Even if there is statistically significant correlation further back in time, it is
hard to find any systematic pattern. (3) Promotions are associated with large wage
increases. (4) Wage increases on promotion are small relative to the difference be-
tween average wages across levels of the job ladder. (5) Wage increases predict
promotion. But the effect is of no practical significance. There is support in the
data for most of the predictions in the GW99 model.
The estimation of the GW99 model showed that selection of workers into a
given position within a firm hierarchy is based on comparative advantage. Both
measurable and unmeasurable skills are important. This holds for both occupa-
tions studied. When it comes to firms learning about their workers, the results are
not so clear, although the joint test for equality holds for both occupations. That is,
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the comparative advantage hypothesis has support in both occupations when taking
learning into account. For technical white collar workers there seems to be some
support for learning about innate ability explaining mobility at higher ranks. For
administrative white collar workers the comparative advantage hypothesis has full
support when looking at measurable skills and partly support when looking at un-
measurable skills. Compared to Lluis’ work on Germany, it seems that the learning
aspect of the GW99 model has more support in the Norwegian data. This fits Lluis’
argument about apprenticeships in Germany reducing the importance of learning
and the fact that such an apprenticeship system is not present in my sample.
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